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Full Description
Constitutional democracy addresses the widely held belief that liberal democracy embodies an uneasy compromise of incompatible values: those of liberal rights on the one hand, and democratic equality on the other. Liberalism is said to compromise democracy, while democracy is said to endanger the values of liberalism. It is these theses that Janos Kis examines and tries to refute.Making the assumption that the alleged conflict is to be resolved at the level of institutions, he outlines a new theory of constitutional democracy. A wide range of problems encountered in constitutional democracy are discussed, such as the popular vote, popular sovereignty, and non-elected justices.The volume is composed of three parts. Part One, "Public Good and Civic Virtue", revisits the debate between liberals and democrats on how to interpret the democratic vote. In Part Two, "Liberal Democracy", the author proves that on the level of principles there is no incompatibility between liberalism and democracy and that liberal theory can demonstrate that democratic values follow from fundamental liberal values. In Part Three, "Constitutional Adjudication in a Democracy", the compatibility of democracy and judicial or constitutional review is analyzed and a theory of constitutionalism is outlined.This volume appeals to scholars in political philosophy, political science, and constitutional law, but is also recommended to all those interested in liberal and democratic theory, and the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
Contents
IntroductionNotesTHE COMMON GOOD AND CIVIC VIRTUE1. Liberalism and Republicanism2. The Preference-aggregating Model3. The Ethical Model: the Responsible Voter4. The Ethical Model: the Relation between Private and Communal References5. The Ethical Model: Public Debate and Voting6. On the Relation of the Two Models7. Liberalism and the Descriptive Claims of the Ethical Model8. Virtue in Politics9. The Politics of Virtue and Personal Autonomy10. Concluding RemarksNotesLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST THE COMPROMISE THESIS1. Introduction2. The Conflict3. Constitutional Constraints, Constitutional Review4. Political Equality and Rule by the Majority5. Equality of Votes and Equality of Voters6. Contractarian Theory: the Selection of Voting Rules7. A Weakness of Contractarian Theory8. The Typology of Preferences9. Filtering the Preferences of the Contracting Parties10. Moral Discussion before the Contract11. The Mandate of the Guardians of the Constitution12. Summary and RestrictionsNotesCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW1. Introduction1.1. Two Conceptions1.2. Questions of Principle and Questions of Regulation1.3. The Means of Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution1.4. A Brief Overview of What Follows2. Interpreting the Constitution2.1 Popular Sovereignty2.2 Only That Which is "in the Text"2.3. Strict Reading2.4. Historical Readings2.5. Substantive Readings: Structural Interpretation2.6. Substantive Interpretations: the Moral Reading2.7. Special Objections: The Structural Reading2.8. Special Objections: the Moral Reading2.9. Substantive Readings: Critical Interpretations2.10. General Objections against Substantial Reading2.11. Constitution Making3. Striking down Legislation3.1. Once again on Popular Sovereignty3.2. "The Tyranny of the Majority"3.3.The Power of Self-binding: Analogies from Individual Action3.4. Communal Agency3.5. Constitutional Self-binding3.6. Judicial Review, Substantive Reading3.7. The Limits of Constitutional Review3.8. Precautionary Guidelines3.9. SummaryNotes1. The Interpretive Practice of the Constitutional Court1.1. The Self-understanding of the Court: Substantive Reading1.2. Critical Reading: the Abolition of Death Penalty1.3. Strict Textualism. the Issue of the Legal Status of Fetuses1.4. A Shift in Self-understanding: Transitional Justice1.5. The Decline of Rights Adjudication1.6. The Upsurge of Welfare Protection1.7. The Paradoxes of Welfare Protection2. Summary and Glance to Future2.1. Theses2.2. Measuring the First Constitutional Court by our Theses2.3. From 'Legal Revolution' to the 'Consolidation of the Rule of Law'NotesIndexNER(01): GB
