Full Description
This book, Advances in Economic Design, celebrates the birth of SED, the Society for Economic Design. It grew out of SED 2000, the first International Conference of the Society for Economic Design, which took place in istanbul during 23-27 lune, 2000. While it is not a proceedings or even a selected proceedings volume, it nevertheless contains many chapters which derive from papers presented at SED 2000, although they have typically been substantially reworked, extended and deepened. Of course, all the papers published in this book were anonymously refe reed. As a collection of selected essays, the book displays the state of the art across a broad spectrum of theoretical questions and topics and areas of application which economic designers are investigating. This characteristic of the book is reflected in its organization into seven parts: (A) Social Choice and Electoral Systems, (B) Buyers and SeIlers, (C) Bargaining, (D) Coalitional Stability and Efficiency, (E) Regulating and Organizing Markets, (F) Designing Rights, (G) Information. Most of the chapters of this book were edited for their English. Ms. ludith Tucker edited Chapters A2, A3, BI, B3, Cl, C4, DI, D2, D3, E2, E3, F2, F3 and F4, while Dr. Noah Hardy linguistically edited Chapters B2, B4 and C3. We thank Ms. Tucker and Dr. Hardy for their diligent support in this regard.
Contents
A: Social Choice and Electoral Systems.- Selecting a Social Choice Rule — An Exploratory Panel Study.- Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency.- Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem.- B : Buyers and Sellers.- On Determination of Optimal Reserve Price in Auctions with Common Knowledge about Ranking of Valuations.- On Auctions with Interest Linkages among Bidders.- Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models.- Core Convergence in Two-Sided Matching Markets.- C: Bargaining.- Can and Should the Nash Program Be Looked at as a Part of Mechanism Theory?.- Impossibility of a Walrasian Bargaining Solution.- Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem.- Kalai-Smorodinsky and Maschler-Perles Solutions under Pre-donation.- D: Coalitional Stability and Efficiency.- Stable Cartel Structures in a Dismantling Game.- A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities.- Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.- E: Regulating and Organizing Markets.- Regulation and Markets for Catastrophe Insurance.- Incentive Compatible Regulation of Quality Provision by Natural Monopolies — The Role of Technical Progress.- On the Importance of Sequencing of Markets in Monetary Economies.- F: Designing Rights.- The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks.- Designing Severance Payments and Decision Rights for Efficient Plant Closure under Profit-Sharing.- Moral Hazard and Linear Contracts: Economies with Idiosyncratic Risks.- Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy.- G: Information.- Mechanism Design without Games.- Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty.
