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基本説明
New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 2000. This book argues that recent official proposals for reforming the "international architecture" are also unlikely to reduce the frequency of currency and financial crises to an acceptable level.
Full Description
Recent crises in emerging markets have raised doubts about the desirability of relaxing controls on capital mobility. George Fane, however, uses evidence from the crises in Asia and Latin America to reassert the traditional case that such controls are an excessively blunt instrument for achieving financial stability.This book argues that recent official proposals for reforming the 'international financial architecture' are also unlikely to reduce the frequency of currency and financial crises to an acceptable level. The author proposes an alternative plan to achieve greater financial stability:
banks should have to double the currently accepted percentage of capital to risk-weighted assets from 8 to 16 percent and the risk-weights for loans to emerging markets should also be raised substantially
the financial sectors in emerging markets should be fully opened to foreign competition
bankruptcy procedures in emerging markets should be greatly strengthened
central banks should adopt flexible exchange rates, backed by credible targets for inflation or monetary growth. If flexible exchange rates are not adopted, central banks should at least avoid the widespread practice of trying to sterilise the monetary effects of capital flows
The author argues that the implementation of this plan will be a far more effective way of enhancing financial stability than controlling international capital flows, or trying to force private lenders to make new loans to countries that suffer crises.
This book will be required reading for scholars and policymakers in the areas of international financial economics, financial regulation, development economics and Asian studies.
Contents
Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. Capital Controls and Exchange Controls 3. Capital Controls and Crisis Prevention: Four Case Studies 4. First and Second- Best Arguments for Capital Controls 5. Speculative Crises, Default and Contagion 6. Banks, Moral Hazard and Prudential Regulations 7. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 8. The Credibility of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 9. Reforming the International Financial Architecture References Index
