Acknowledgements                                   ix
Introduction Why Does Trustworthiness Pay?
Three Answers
  Elias L. Khalil                                  xiii
PART I TRUST AS STRATEGY
  1. Gordon Tullock (1985), 'Adam Smith and the    3   (9)
  Prisoners' Dilemma', Quarterly Journal of
  Economics,100 (402), Supplement, 1073-81
  2. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion (1988),       12  (6)
  'The Further Evolution of Cooperation',
  Science, 242 (4884), 9 December, 1385-90
  3. Jack Hirshleifer (1999), 'There are Many      18  (21)
  Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation',
  Journal of Bioeconomics,1(1), 73-93
  4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible        39  (22)
  Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
  Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4),
  September, 519-40
  5. David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts    61  (8)
  and Robert Wilson (1982), 'Rational
  Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
  Prisoners' Dilemma', Journal of Economic
  Theory, 21(2), August, 245-52
  6. John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry       69  (35)
  Samuelson (1995), 'Learning to Be Imperfect:
  The Ultimatum Game', Games and Economic
  Behavior, 8, 56-90
  7. Edward H. Lorenz (1988), 'Neither Friends     104 (17)
  nor Strangers: Informal Networks of
  Subcontracting in French Industry', in Diego
  Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking
  Cooperative Relations, Chapter 12, Oxford:
  Basil Blackwell, 194-210
  8. Keith Hart (1988), 'Kinship, Contract, and    121 (18)
  Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants
  in an African City Slum', in Diego Gambetta
  (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative
  Relations, Chapter 11, Oxford: Basil
  Blackwell, 176-93
  9. Peter Kollock (1994), 'The Emergence of       139 (33)
  Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of
  Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust', American
  Journal of Sociology,100 (2), September,
  313-45
  10. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R.       172 (32)
  Weingast (1994), 'Coordination, Commitment,
  and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant
  Guild', Journal of Political Economy, 102
  (4), August, 745-76
  11. Oliver E. Williamson (1993),                 204 (34)
  'Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic
  Organization', Journal of Law and Economics,
  XXXVI (1, Part 2), April, 453-86
  12. Bart Nooteboom (1996), 'Trust,               238 (26)
  Opportunism and Governance: A Process and
  Control Model', Organization Studies, 17 (6),
  985-1010
  13. Bernd Lahno (2001), 'On the Emotional        264 (21)
  Character of Trust', Ethical Theory and Moral
  Practice, 4 (2), June, 171-89
PART II TRUSTAS TASTE
  14. Ernst Pehr and Simon G臘hter (2000),         285 (23)
  'Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
  Reciprocity', Journal of Econoinic
  Perspectives, 14 (3), Summer, 159-81
  15. Werner G�th and Reinhard Tietz (1990),       308 (33)
  'Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and
  Comparison of Experimental Results', Journal
  of Economic Psychology, 11 (4), December,
  417-49
  16. Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro     341 (28)
  Okuno-Fujiwara and Samuel Zamir (1991),
  'Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem,
  Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An
  Experimental Study', American Economic
  Review, 81(5), December, 1068-95
  17. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel          369 (6)
  Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert
  Grotis and Richard McElreath (2001), 'In
  Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral
  Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies',
  American Economic Review, Papers and
  Proceedings, 91 (2), May, 73-8
  18. James Andreoni (1988), 'Why Free Ride?       375 (14)
  Strategies and Learning in Public Goods
  Experiments', Journal of Public Economics, 37
  (3), December, 291-304
  19. Richard H. Thaler with Robyn M. Dawes        389 (17)
  (1992), 'Cooperation', in The Winner � Curse.
  Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life,
  Chapter 2, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
  University Press, 6-20, references
  20. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin          406 (21)
  McCabe (1995), 'Trust, Reciprocity, and
  Social History', Games and Economic Behavior,
  10,122-42
  21. Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl    427 (20)
  Boeing (2000), 'Trust, Reciprocity, and
  Social History: A Re-examination',
  Experimental Economics, 3 (1), June, 81-100
  22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and         447 (14)
  Richard Thaler (1986), 'Fairness as a
  Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
  the Market', American Economic Review, 76
  (4), September, 728-41
  23. George A. Akerlof (1982), 'Labor             461 (27)
  Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange',
  Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCVII (4),
  November, 543-69
  24. Matthew Rabin (1993), 'Incorporating         488 (22)
  Fairness into Game Theory and Economics',
  American Economic Review, 83 (5), December,
  1281-302
  25. David K. Levine (1998), 'Modeling            510 (30)
  Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments',
  Review of Economic Dynamics, 1 (3), July,
  593-622
  26. Amitai Etzioni (1986), 'The Case foi- a      540 (25)
  Multiple-Utility Conception', Economics amid
  Philosophy, 2 (2), October, 159-83
  27. Amartya K. Sen (1977), 'Rational Fools: A    565 (28)
  Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
  Economic Theory', Philosophy and Public
  Affairs, 6 (4), 317-44
  28. Elias L. Khalil (1999), 'Sentimental         593 (16)
  Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sera's Notion of
  Commitment', Journal of Economic Behavior and
  Organization, 40 (4), December, 373-86
PART III TRUST AS TRAIT
  29. Ulrich Witt (1986), 'Evolution and           609 (22)
  Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable
  Contracts', Kyklos, 39 (2), 245-66
  30. Werner G�th, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel      631 (28)
  Peleg (2000), 'Co-evolution of Preferences
  and Information in Simple Games of Trust',
  German Economic Review, l (1), February,
  83-110
  31. Werner G�th and Menahem E. Yaari (1992),     659 (12)
  'Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple
  Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach',
  in Ulrich Witt (ed.), Explaining Process and
  Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics,
  Chapter 2, Ann Arbor, MI: University of
  Michigan Press, 23-34
  32. Herbert Gintis (2000), 'Strong               671 (11)
  Reciprocity and Human Sociality', Journal of
  Theoretical Biology, 206,169-79
  33. Robert H. Frank (1987), 'If Homo             682 (12)
  Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility
  Function, Would He Want One with a
  Conscience?', American Economic Review, 77
  (4), September, 593-604
  34. Jack Hirshleifer (1987), 'On the Emotions    694 (20)
  as Guarantors of Threats and Promises', in
  John Depr� (ed.), The Latest on the Best:
  Essays on Evolution and Optimality, Chapter
  14, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 307-26
  35. J�rn P.W. Scharlemann, Catherine C.          714 (24)
  Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson
  (2001), 'The Value of a Smile: Game Theory
  with a Human Face', Journal of Economic
  Psychology, 22, 617-40
  36. Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten           738 (27)
  (2000), 'An Experiment on the Hypothesis of
  Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining',
  Games and Economic Behavior, 33 (1), October,
  90-116
Name Index                                         765