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基本説明
Investigates conceptual problems in cognitive neuroscience, i.e. that branch of neuroscience that is concerned with the neural basis of our cognitive and volitional capacities.
Full Description
In this provocative work, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience. Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories, including those of Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz. They propose that conceptual confusions about how the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of research carried out by neuroscientists, in terms of the questions they choose to address, the description and interpretation of results and the conclusions they draw. The book forms both a critique of the practice of cognitive neuroscience and a conceptual handbook for students and researchers.
Contents
Preface. Part I: Philosophical Problems In Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots: 1. The Early Growth Of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System. Aristotle, Galen And Nemesius: The Origins Of The Ventricular Doctrine. Fernel And Descartes: The Demise Of The Ventricular Doctrine. The Cortical Doctrine Of Willis And Its Aftermath. The Conception Of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie And Marshall Hall. Localizing Function In The Cortex: Broca, Fritz And Hitzig. The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System: Sherrington. 2. The Cortex And The Mind In The Work Of Sherrington And His Proteges. Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact. Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism. John Eccles And The 'Liaison Brain'. Wilder Penfield And The 'Highest Brain Mechanism'. 3. The Mereological Fallacy And Its Manifestation In Contemporary Neuroscientific Thought. Mereological Confusions In Cognitive Neuroscience: (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird). Methodological Qualms: (Ullman, P.S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire And Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry). On The Grounds For Ascribing Psychological Predicates To A Being: (Crick, Baars). On The Grounds For Misascribing Psychological Predicates To An Inner Entity: (Damasio, Edelman And Tononi, Kosslyn And Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick). The Inner: (Damasio). Introspection: (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz). Privileged Access: Direct And Indirect: (Blakemore). Privacy Or Subjectivity: (Searle). The Meaning Of Psychological Predicates And How They Are Learnt: (Searle). Of The Mind And Its Nature: (Gazzaniga, Doty). Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: an Analysis: Preliminaries. Brain-Body Dualism: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Libet). The Project: (Gazzaniga). The Category Of The Psychological: (Nagel, P.M. Churchland And P.S. Churchland). 4. Sensation and Perception. Sensation: (Searle, Libet, Geldard And Sherrick). Perception: (Ledoux, Crick). Perception As The Causation Of Sensations: Primary And Secondary Qualities: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Rock). Perception As Hypothesis Formation: Helmholtz: (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young).
