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基本説明
Interviews and contributions from the 20th Arne Ryde Symposium.
Full Description
Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, And Decision Making is based on research presented at the 20th Arne Ryde Symposium on Experimental Economics, held on November 9-11 at Lund University. The volume is divided into two parts.
In Part I, interviews with prominent researchers in the field, all invited speakers at the Symposium, are presented. Those interviewed are Peter Bohm, Catherine Eckel, Werner Güth, John Hey, Daniel Kahneman, Alvin Roth, Vernon Smith, and Martin Weber. The interviews address important questions about basic experimental methods and the interpretation of results. In addition, these researchers answer questions relating to their specific fields and to their contributions at the Symposium. They are also asked to single out the most important findings in the field.
Part II contains selected contributions from the conference. Topics covered include attitudes towards risk and inequality; pitfalls in experimental economics; analysis of trading-period duration; robustness in learning; video experiments on decision making and fairness; sequential prisoners' dilemmas; and collusion in auctions.
Contents
I Interviews with Invited Speakers.- 1 Peter Bohm.- 2 Catherine C. Eckel.- 3 Werner Güth.- 4 John Hey.- 5 Daniel Kahneman.- 6 Alvin Roth.- 7 Vernon Smith.- 8 Martin Weber.- II Contributions.- 9 Attitudes towards Risk and Inequality.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Theoretical Background.- 2.1 Inequality and Risk.- 2.2 The Meaning of Inequality and of Risk.- 2.3 An Axiomatic Approach.- 3 The Experiment.- 3.1 Issues.- 3.2 Implementation.- 4 Data.- 5 Numerical responses and the Principle of Transfers.- 5.1 Descriptive results.- 5.2 Regression Analysis.- 6 Numerical Responses: variation by Type of Income Transfer.- 6.1 Descriptive Analysis.- 6.2 Regression Analysis.- 6.3 A provisional evaluation.- 7 The Verbal Question.- 7.1 The structure of the question.- 7.2 Verbal question: descriptive results.- 7.3 Regression analysis.- 8 Conclusions.- 1 Variable definitions.- 2 The Questionnaires.- 10 Pitfalls in Experimental Economics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Monetary Incentive Levels.- 3 Subjects.- 4 Testing Theory in Context or Non-Context Environments.- 5 Stationary Repetitions.- 6 Concluding Remarks.- 11 The Effect of Trading Period Duration.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Relevant Literature and Research Hypotheses.- 3 Experimental Design.- 3.1 Overview of Experimental Procedures and Design.- 3.2 Experimental Markets.- 3.3 Participants and Motivation.- 3.4 Specific Market Designs.- 4 Analysis and Results.- 4.1 Data Considerations.- 4.2 Experimental Markets Group One (PN Markets).- Volume of Trade.- Informational Efficiency.- Allocational Efficiency.- 4.3 Experimental Markets Group Two (IN Markets).- Volume of Trade.- Informational Efficiency.- Allocational Efficiency.- 4.4 Experimental Markets Groups Three and Four.- 5 Discussion and Conclusions.- 12 Robust Learning Experiments.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Auctions and Fair Division Games.- 3 Reputation formation.- 4 Endogenous timing in bilateral negotiations.- 5 Alternating offer bargaining.- 6 Discussion.- 13 The Impact of Fairness on Decision Making.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Relevant Literature.- 3 Method.- 4 Experimental design.- 4.1 The Ultimatum Game.- 4.2 The Tripled Take Game.- 4.3 An Alternating Offer Bargaining Game.- 4.4 Procedure.- 5 Results.- 5.1 Fairness is synonymous to equity.- 5.2 The influence of fairness on decision making.- 6 Conclusion.- 14 The Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Previous Experiments.- 3 Models and Predictions.- 3.1 Inequality Aversion.- 3.2 Altruism.- 4 Experimental Design.- 5 Results.- 6 Conclusions.- 15 Collusion in Auctions.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Game.- 2.1 Nash Equilibria of the Stage Game.- 2.2 Collusion in the Repeated Game.- Simple collusion.- Efficient collusion.- 3 The Experimental Design.- 3.1 Hypotheses.- 4 Results.- 4.1 Average Earnings.- 4.2 Bidding Behavior.- 4.3 Bidding Proposals.- Round 1 data.- Overall data.- 4.4 Value Messages.- 4.5 Sidepayments.- 5 Conclusion.- Appendix: Collusion in Equilibrium.- Incentives to tell the truth.- Incentives to bid low.- Incentives to give sidepayments.
