『ル－ズベルトの責任 　日米戦争はなぜ始まったか』(原書)<br>President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 : Appearances and Realities

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『ル－ズベルトの責任 　日米戦争はなぜ始まったか』(原書)
President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 : Appearances and Realities

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 644 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780765809988
  • DDC分類 973.917

基本説明

With a new introduction by Campbell Craig. Beard concludes that FDR's image as a neutral, peace-loving leader was a smokescreen, behind which he planned for war against Germany and Japan even well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Full Description

Conceived by Charles Beard as a sequel to his provocative study of American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War outraged a nation, permanently damaging Beard's status as America's most influential historian.

Beard's main argument is that both Democratic and Republican leaders, but Roosevelt above all, worked quietly in 1940 and 1941 to insinuate the United States into the Second World War. Basing his work on available congressional records and administrative reports, Beard concludes that FDR's image as a neutral, peace-loving leader was a smokescreen, behind which he planned for war against Germany and Japan even well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Beard contends that the distinction between aiding allies in Europe like Great Britain and maintaining strict neutrality with respect to nations like Germany and Japan was untenable. Beard does not argue that all nations were alike, or that some did and others did not merit American support, but rather that Roosevelt chose to aid Great Britain secretly and unconstitutionally rather than making the case to the American public. President Roosevelt shifted from a policy of neutrality to one of armed intervention, but he did so without surrendering the appearance, the fiction of neutrality. This core argument makes the work no less explosive in 2003 than it was when first issued in 1948.

Contents

I: Appearances; I: Moral Commitments for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs in 1941; II: Representations of Lend-Lease Aid to the Allies; III: Patrolling as Appearances; IV: The Atlantic Conference—Appearances; V: "In Case of Attack" in the Atlantic; VI: No Call for "Any Declaration of War"; VI: Appearances of Relations with Japan; VIII: The Attack—Official Explanation; II: Unveiling Realities; IX: The Beginning of Revelations; X: The Official Thesis Challenged in Congress and the Press; XI: Army and Navy Boards Undermine the Official Thesis; XII: A Congressional Committee Probes the Records and Reports; III: Realities as Described by the Pearl Harbor Documents; XIII: Engineering the Official Thesis of Guilt; XIV: Secret War Decisions and Plans; XV: Actualities of the Atlantic Conference; XVI: "Complicated. Moves" in Relations with Japan; XVII: Maneuvering the Japanese into Firing the First Shot; IV: Epilogue; XVIII: Interpretations Tested by Consequences