Elbridge Gerry's Salamander : The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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Elbridge Gerry's Salamander : The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 248 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780521001540
  • DDC分類 328.73

Full Description

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in America's history. Moreover, they changed what would happen at law should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides a detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.

Contents

Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction; 2. The reapportionment revolution; Part II. Democrats and Republicans: 3. A model of Congressional redistricting in the US; 4. The case of the disappearing bias; 5. The role of the courts in the 1960s redistricting process; 6. Bias, responsiveness and the courts; 7. Redistricting's differing impact on Democratic and Republican incumbents; Part III. Incumbents and Challengers: 8. The growth of the incumbency advantage; 9. Redistricting and electoral coordination; 10. Redistricting, the probability of securing a majority and entry; 11. Reassessing the incumbency advantage; Part IV. Conclusion: 12. Conclusion.