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Full Description
This series is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in this highly fertile field of philosophy. The subject is broadly construed, taken to include not only perennially central topics (modality, ontology, and mereology; metaphysical theories of causation, laws of nature, persistence through time, and time itself; and realism and anti-realism in the many senses of these terms); but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions that open up within other subfields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science (questions about supervenience and materialism, the nature of qualia, mental causation, metaphysical implications of relativity and quantum physics, mereological theories of biological species, and so on). Besides independent essays, volumes are likely to contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Each volume will also include an essay by the winner of the Oxford Studies in Metaphysics younger scholar award, a prize inaugurated with this first issue.
Contents
I. PRESENTISM ; 1. Tensed Qualifiers ; 2. A Defense of Presentism ; 3. Symposium: Defining Presentism ; On Presentism and Triviality ; Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of Tensism ; Reply to Ludlow ; 4. Presentism and Truthmaking ; II. UNIVERSALS ; 5. A Theory of Properties ; 6. How Do Particulars Stand to Universals? ; 7. Non-symmetric Relations ; III. FREEDOM, CAUSAL POWERS, AND CAUSATION ; 8. The Mental Problems of the Many ; 9. Properties and Powers ; 10. The Intrinsic Character of Causation ; 11. Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?