米国憲法の経済学的分析<br>To Form a More Perfect Union : A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution

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米国憲法の経済学的分析
To Form a More Perfect Union : A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 408 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780195139709
  • DDC分類 342.73029

基本説明

It employs cliometric analysis, formal economic analysis, and modern statistial techniques, to explain the choices the founders made during the drafting and ratificaiton of the constitution.

Full Description

This is a quantitative reexamination of the behavior of the Founding Fathers during the creation of the United States' Constitution. It employs cliometric analysis, formal economic analysis, and modern statistical techniques, to explain the choices the founders made during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. These include: What form of government did the founders intend for the Constitution? What factors motivated them to adopt particular clauses in the Constitution? What factors led them to ratify the Constitution? The author argues that the findings challenge the prevailing interpretation of the formation of the Constitution.

Contents

Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation
1: The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation
2: Economics and the Constitution
Part I: The Philadelphia Convention of 1787
3: The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution
4: Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution
5: The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution
Part II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790
6: The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation
7: The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions
Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification
Appendixes
Appendix 1: Documents
Appendix 2: The Data and Their Sources
Appendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention
Appendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention
Appendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention
Appendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions
Appendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions
Notes
References
Index