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基本説明
Assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.
Full Description
Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.
Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.
Contents
PermissionsForewordAn Appreciation1Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games32The Bargaining Problem53Non-Cooperative Games144An Iterative Method of Solving a Game275Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form366Extensive Games and the Problem and Information467A Value for n-Person Games698Stochastic Games809Recursive Games8710Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments11911A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy12712The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games14013Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders17014The Core of an n-Person Game19215Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model216Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points247Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game26816The Big Match28917On Market Games29618Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games317List of Contributors355Index357
