基本説明
Overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War revealing that the South Vietnamese government was winning the war until the coup of November 1963. It also shows that President Johnson ruled out several other aggressive policy options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence.
Full Description
Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken, first published in 2007, overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many insights into the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.
Contents
Preface; 1. Heritage; 2. Two Vietnams: July 1954-December 1955; 3. Peaceful coexistence: 1956-9; 4. Insurgency: 1960; 5. Commitment: 1961; 6. Rejuvenation: January-June 1962; 7. Attack: July-December 1962; 8. The battle of Ap Bac: January 1963; 9. Diem on trial: February-July 1963; 10. Betrayal: August 1963; 11. Self-destruction: September-November 2, 1963; 12. The return of the twelve warlords: November 3-December 1963; 13. Self-imposed restrictions: January-July 1964; 14. Signals: August-October 1964; 15. Invasion: November-December 1964; 16. The prize for victory: January-May 1965; 17. Decision: June-July 1965.
