Full Description
This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.
Contents
List of Tables and Figures Preface and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction The Naval Staff and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 Anglo-German Naval Relations, June 1935 to July 1937 Naval Staff Perceptions of German Naval Strategy, 1934-39 Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39 The Naval Staff, British Strategy, and the German Menace, 1934-38 The Naval Staff and Defence and Foreign Policy, 1937-38 The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938-39 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index
