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基本説明
New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 1997.
Full Description
Why doesn't all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark," without any consciousness at all? In this book philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies.At the 1994 landmark conference "Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness", philosopher David Chalmers distinguished between the "easy" problems and the "hard" problem of consciousness research. According to Chalmers, the easy problems are to explain cognitive functions such as discrimination, integration, and the control of behavior; the hard problem is to explain why these functions should be associated with phenomenal experience. Why doesnt all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark", without any consciousness at all? In this book, philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies. Some take issue with Chalmers' distinction, arguing that the hard problem is a non-problem, or that the explanatory gap is too wide to be bridged. Others offer alternative suggestions as to how the problem might be solved, whether through cognitive science, fundamental physics, empirical phenomenology, or with theories that take consciousness as irreducible.ContributorsBernard J. Baars, Douglas J. Bilodeau, David Chalmers, Patricia S. Churchland, Thomas Clark, C. J. S. Clarke, Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Stuart Hameroff, Valerie Hardcastle, David Hodgson, Piet Hut, Christof Koch, Benjamin Libet, E. J. Lowe, Bruce MacLennan, Colin McGinn, Eugene Mills, Kieron OHara, Roger Penrose, Mark C. Price, William S. Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, Tom Scott, William Seager, Jonathan Shear, Roger N. Shepard, Henry Stapp, Francisco J. Varela, Max Velmans, Richard Warner
Contents
Part 1 The hard problemDavid J. Chalmers. Part 2 Deflationary perspectives: facing backwards on the problem of consciousness, Daniel C. Dennett; the Hornswoggle problem, Patricia Smith Churchland; function and phenomenology - closing the explanatory gap, Thomas W. Clark; the why of consciousness - a non-issue for materialists, Valerie Gray Hardcastle; there is no hard problem of consciousness, Kieron O'Hara and Tom Scutt; should we expect to feel as if we understand consciousness?, Mark C. Price. Part 3 The explanatory gap: consciousness and space, Colin McGinn; giving up on the hard problem of consciousness, Eugene O. Mills; there are no easy problems of consciousness, E.J. Lowe; the easy problems ain't so easy, David Hodgson; facing ourselves - incorrigibility and the mind-body problem, Richard Warner; the hardness of the hard problem, William S. Robinson. Part 4 Physics: the nonlocality of mind, C.J.S. Clarke; conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections, Stuart R. Hameroff and Roger Penrose; the hard problem - a quantum approach, Henry P. Stapp; physics, machines and the hard problem, Douglas J. Bilodeau. Part 5 Neuroscience and cognitive science: why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness, Francis Crick and Christof Koch; understanding subjectivity - global workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self, Bernard J. Baars; the elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates, Bruce MacLennan. Part 6 Rethinking nature: consciousness, information and panpsychism, William Seager; rethinking nature - a hard problem within the hard problem, Gregg H. Rosenberg; solutions to the hard problem of consciousness, Benjamin Libet; turning "the hard problem" upside down and sideways, Piet Hut and Roger N. Shepard. Part 7 First-person perspectives: the relation of consciousness to the material world, Max Velmand; neurophenomenology - a methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco J. Varela; the hard problem - closing the empirical gap, Jonathan Shear. Part 8 Response: moving forward on the problem of consciousness, David J. Chalmers.
