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基本説明
New in papetback. Hardcover was pyblished in 1988. "A Bradford Book".
Full Description
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.
Contents
Part 1 Meaning and mentalismmentalism can't be right; connections between 1,2, and 3. Part 2 Meaning, other people and the world: the division of linguistic labour; elms, beeches and searle; the contribution of the environment; an indexical component; other natural kinds; references and theory change; meaning and "Mental Representation". Part 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content": narrow content as a "Function of Observable Properties"; "Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role"; concluding remarks. Part 4 Are there such things as reference and truth?: why "Folk Psychology" and not "Folk Logic"?; disquotation, anyone?; the "Semantical Conception" of truth; disquotation as disappearance. Part 5 Why functionalism didn't work: sociofunctionalism; what "In Principle" means here; the single-computational-state version of functionalism; equivalence; surveying rationality. Part 6 Other forms of functionalism: David Lewis and I; Lewis's theory further examined; conclusion. Part 7 A sketch of an alternative picture: objectivity and conceptual relativity; internal realism as an alternative picture; my present diagnosis of the "Functionalism" issue.
