基本説明
Publication delayed (Originally scheduled in January 2003).
Full Description
Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of "classical" works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is "interpretive" in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.
Contents
Interpretation and Law - Why is Interpretation Important for LawDworkin (1994) Law, Philosophy and Interpretation; Joseph Raz (1996) Why Interpret. Interpretation and Legal Reasoning - Law and Morality: Michael Detmold (1989) Law as Practical Reason; Fernando Atria (1999) Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited; Michael Moore (1985) A Natural Law Theory of Legal Interpretation. Interpretation and Application of Legal Rules, Vagueness and Defeasibility: Robert Alexy (1993) Justification and Application of Norms; Gunther Klaus (1993) Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's Spcial Case Thesis; Zenon Bankowski (1996) Law, Love and Computers; Carlos Alchourron (1996) On Law and Logic. Legal Interpretation and Politics: Roberto Unger (1996) Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination; Emilios Christodoulidis (1996) The Inertia of Institutional Imagination - A Reply to Roberto Unger. Interpretation and Objectivity: Charles Yablon (1987) Law and Metaphysics; Jes Bjarup (1988) Kripke's Case; Stanley Fish (1989) Working in the Chain Gang, reprinted in Fish, "Doing What Comes Naturally". Interpreting the Law: M. Van Dunne (1998) Normative and Narrative Coherence in Legal Decision-Making; Jerzy Worblewski and Neil MacCormick (1994) Justification and Interpretation; Aleksander Peczenik (1988) Authority Reasons in Legal and Moral Reasoning; Robert Summers (1978) Two Types of Substantive Reasons; Neil MacCormick (1999) Reasonableness and Objectivity.
